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Abstract
We present results from an experiment based on Hafalir and Krishna’s (2008)
model of auctions with resale. As predicted weak bidders bid more with resale than
without and resale raises average auction prices. When the equilibrium calls for
weak types to bid higher than their values with resale they do so, but not nearly as
much as the theory predicts. When the equilibrium calls for weak bidders to bid
their value with resale, outcomes are much closer to the risk neutral Nash model’s
predictions.
JEL classiﬁcation: D44, C90
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1 Introduction
Auctions with resale have been the subject of considerable theoretical interest lately. Haile
(2000, 2001, 2003) studies auctions where bidders have noisy signals about their values,
as well as potential new buyers arriving after the initial auction, to motivate interest in
the subject. Garratt and Troeger’s (2006) research is motivated by the role of speculators,
bidders with zero value for the item, who buy with a view to resell and who compete with
bidders who buy for own use. Hafalir and Krishna (2008) study auctions where bidders
have asymmetric valuations, a feature that is present to some degree or other in a number
of auctions, so that a lower value bidder may obtain the item but can proﬁtably resell it
to a higher value bidder.
The present paper experimentally investigates the eﬀect of resale in asymmetric auc-
tions following the Hafalir and Krishna (2008) model. In their model a weak and a strong
bidder ﬁrst compete for the item in a ﬁrst-price private value auction. The winner of the
item then has the opportunity to sell it to the other bidder using a take it or leave it
price. Key comparative static predictions of the model are that the weak player bids more
than without resale in order to win the item and resell it, to the point that weak bidders
may even bid more their value for the item. The strong player responds by bidding more
aggressively for a wide range of private values. The net result is that resale raises auction
prices, beneﬁting the seller, and eﬃciency improves compared to the no resale case1.
Our experiment looks at two main treatments: In the ﬁrst treatment the risk neutral
Nash equilibrium (RNNE) calls for weak bidders to consistently bid above their private
values when resale opportunities are present, winning half the auctions and making small
positive average proﬁts. Results show that weak bidders do, indeed, consistently bid above
their private values, but not by nearly as much as the RNNE requires. The net result is
that there is not nearly as much resale as predicted, with weak bidders consistently losing
money conditional on winning the item in the auction, which drives biding down even
1Improved eﬃciency is not a general result. In the Hafalir and Krishna framework, if we assume
uniform distributions of the values for both types, resale improves eﬃciency only if the ratio between the
maximum values of the two types is greater than 2 (for details see Hafalir and Krishna 2009). This is true
in all treatments we run.
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further. We explore the reasons for the negative average proﬁts which have partly to do
with the knife edge nature of the equilibrium outcome, so that it is easily upset by loss
aversion on the part of weak bidders and/or bidding above the RNNE by strong bidders
(a not uncommon occurrence).
The second treatment is designed so that weak players bid their value in equilibrium so
that there is no opportunity for losses or loss aversion to impact outcomes. We explore this
treatment ﬁrst in auctions with only resale opportunities present and then using a dual
market procedure whereby subjects ﬁrst bid in an auction without resale opportunities and
then bid again, with exactly the same private values, in an auction with resale. In both
cases weak bidders consistently make positive proﬁts conditional on winning the item and
bid higher than absent resale opportunities and nearly equal to their values throughout.
Auction prices are signiﬁcantly higher with resale opportunities than without, and the
distribution of bids becomes more symmetric than absent resale opportunities, although
not completely symmetric as the theory predicts.
To our knowledge there exist only two other experimental studies of auctions with
resale: Georganas (2003) looks at symmetric English auctions where resale opportunities
arise out of small deviations from equilibrium bidding that become magniﬁed once resale
opportunities are present. Lange, List and Price (2004) study symmetric ﬁrst price auc-
tions where opportunities for resale result from bidder uncertainty regarding the value of
the item. Results from neither of these studies is directly applicable to our environment.
More relevant is the growing literature on asymmetric private value auctions, in particular
the Guth, Ivanova-Stenzel, and Wolfstetter (2005) experiment which employs supports
similar to ours.
The outline of the paper is as follows: The next section outlines the theoretical implica-
tions of auctions with resale following the Hafalir and Krishna (2008) model as it relates to
our parameterization. Section 3 outlines our experimental design and procedures. Section
4 reports our results. Section 5 summarizes our results and conclusions.
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2 Theoretical Implications
In auctions with resale, bidders ﬁrst compete in a ﬁrst-price sealed bid auction to buy the
item. Following the auction, the winner has an opportunity to sell the item at a take it
or leave it price to the losing bidder, absent any information about the losing player’s bid.
There is one weak and one strong bidder in each play of the game with a single item for
sale. The strong bidders value for the item is based on an iid from a uniform distribution
with support [0, as] where as = 100 in both treatments. Private values for weak bidders
are iid from a uniform distribution with support [0, aw] where aw is 10 in one treatment
and 34 in the other. We will refer to the case where aw = 10 as W10 and when aw = 34
as W34.
The risk neutral Nash equilibrium (RNNE) bid function for bidder i in auctions with
resale is (see Hafalir and Krishna, 2008)
bi = vi (as+aw)4ai
Absent resale bidders employ the following bid functions (see Plum, 1992)
bs = vi/(1 +
p
1 + γv2i )
bw = vi/(1 +
p
1− γv2i )
with γ = 1/a2w − 1/a2s
The equilibrium bid functions with and without resale are shown in Figure 1. Note
that without resale weak bidders never bid above their value for the item and strong
bidders never bid above the upper bound of the weak bidders support (aw). Further,
absent resale, for any given valuation weak bidders bid higher than strong bidders, which
generates ineﬃcient allocations. With resale, weak bidders increase their bids for all
valuations compared to the no resale case, even bidding above their value for the W10
case. In contrast, strong bidders reduce their bids somewhat relative to the no resale case
for lower valuations, but increase their bids for higher valuations.
With resale, the bid distribution for the weak and strong types is the same. Note, this
does not mean that the bid functions for the two types are the same as the supports for
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Figure 1: The equilibrium bid functions for the case of two bidders with supports in [0,10] and
[0,100] (upper panel) and [0,34] and [0,100] (lower panel), with and without resale.
their values are very diﬀerent. The resulting bid distributions are shown in Figure 2 for
both cases. With resale, a third party observing the bids, but not knowing the bidders
values, would not be able to distinguish between strong and weak types.
A number of other comparative static predictions hold for auctions with resale. At
the market level auction prices should be higher, on average, with resale than without
and auction eﬃciency (interim eﬃciency) will be dramatically lower as weak bidders are
expected to be high bidders half of the time. Following resale there will still be some
ineﬃciency as weak bidders win but are unable to sell in the secondary market. However,
eﬃciency is expected to improve relative to the auction outcome and relative to the no
resale case.
In order to maximize proﬁts in the second stage, the winner has to set an optimal
reserve price. The optimal reserve price r∗ given a winning bid bi is calculated by ﬁrst
updating the support of the opponent’s value. Given a belief that their opponent is using
the RNNE bidding strategy bj(vj) the updated support is [0, b−1j (bi)]. The optimal reserve
price is then 1/2b−1j (bi).
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Figure 2: Cumulative distribution functions for the case of two bidders with supports in [0,10]
and [0,100] (upper panel) and [0,34] and [0,100] (lower panel), with and without resale.
3 Experimental Design and Procedures
The ﬁrst six sessions were evenly divided between the W10 and W34 treatments all involv-
ing only auctions with resale. This was followed by two dual market W34 sessions where
subjects ﬁrst bid in an auction with no opportunity for resale, but before these results were
reported back, as second auction with the opportunity for resale was conducted. Bidders’
values were the same in both markets so that one can compare directly individual subject
bids with and without resale opportunities along with market prices and eﬃciency.
At the start of each session instructions were read out loud with subjects having a copy
to read along with. The instructions explained the auction procedures in detail followed
by a short quiz to make sure subjects understood the payoﬀs with the resale opportunities,
as well as the general auction procedures. Each experimental session began with two dry
runs followed by 40 auctions played for cash (except for the ﬁrst session which had 30 cash
auctions).
New valuations were drawn randomly at the start of each auction period with the
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matching between strong and weak bidders changed randomly prior to each auction. Bid-
der valuations were integer draws from their respective distributions. Half the subjects
were randomly chosen to start as weak types and half as strong types, with these roles
held constant for the ﬁrst half of the paid periods. After this roles were switched for the
rest of the auctions.
In the auctions with resale, the highest bidder in each auction was awarded the good
and paid a price, p1, equal to what she bid. Following this the auction winner had the
opportunity sell the item to the losing bidder setting a reservation price r. The losing
bidder after observing the resale price, decided to buy the item or not. Sellers did not
have any choice whether to put the item up for sale or not. However, they were advised
that if they did not want to sell the item they could set r = 101. If the losing bidder
chose not to buy the item, payoﬀs remained the same as in the auction. If she accepted,
she obtained the good and paid r with ﬁnal payoﬀs of r − p1 for the ﬁrst stage winner
and vi − r for the second stage winner. In the dual market sessions, subjects were paid
randomly on the basis of the outcome in either the no resale or the resale auction.
Feedback after the ﬁnal allocation was determined consisted telling winning biders their
net proﬁts, both players bids and their corresponding valuations, along with their type.
Corresponding information from past periods was available on players computer screens as
well. In the dual market treatment feedback form the no resale market was only available
after completion of the auction with resale.
Subjects received an initial capital balance of 250 experimental currency units (ECUs)
in treatment W10 and 100 ECUs in W34. Any proﬁts or losses were added to these
starting capital balances with subjects paid their end of session balances in cash at the
exchange rate of $1 = 17 ECUs in W10 and $1 = 15ECUs in W34. There was no show
up fee. These diﬀerent starting capital balances and conversion rates were adopted in
view of the lower expected proﬁts for weak players in the W10 treatment along with the
greater threat of bankruptcy. Bankrupt bidders, of which there were two, were no longer
permitted to bid and dismissed with a cash payment of $7.2 Average proﬁts were $35.6
2After a bankruptcy a bidder was chosen at random each period to stay out, as the number of players
left was odd.
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Session Treatment Exchange rate Endowment Paying periods Number of Subjects
1 W10 17 250 30 12
2 W10 17 250 40 16
3 W10 17 250 40 16
4 W34 15 100 40 16
5 W34 15 100 40 14
6 W34 15 100 40 18
7 W34Dual 15 100 40 16
8 W34Dual 15 100 40 18
Table 1: Summary of sessions
and $36.6 in the W10 and W34sessions, respectively.
Subjects were recruited from the undergraduate student population at Ohio State
University. Software for conducting the auctions was developed using zTree (Fishbacher,
2007). Table 1 summarizes the parameters for each experimental session along with the
number of subjects in each session.
4 Experimental Results
Results are presented separately for the W10, W34, and W34Dual sessions. There are two
learning phases to each session, once in the beginning and once when they switch roles.
To focus on more experienced bidding we exclude data from periods 1-10 and 21-30.3
4.1 Weak Bidders with Value Draws [0, 10]
Figure 3 reports bids for strong and weak bidders pooled across experimental sessions in
the form of box plots where each box represents the interquartile range for the distribution
of bids (IQR, which covers 75% of all bids) in the neighborhood of each the discrete values
reported on the horizontal axis. The whiskers go from the end of the box to the most
extreme value within 1.5 times the IQR, covering all but the most extreme outliers. The
straight line within each box represents the median bid. In each case the thin dashed line
3Session 1 had only 30 periods in total, so to be consistent we only consider periods 10-20 from this
session.
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First Stage Second Stage
Prices Interim Eﬃciency Weak type wins Prices Eﬃciency
predicted 18.8 0.54 0.50 22.1 0.82
actual 20.0 0.78 0.26 20.9 0.89
Table 2: Summary of results in treatment 10.
through the origin represents the RNNE bid. The thick solid line is the 45 degree line,
where bids are equal to values.
Strong bidders overbid somewhat relative to the RNNE for low values and un-
derbid very slightly for values between 80 and 90. Weak bidders tend to bid above their
values as the theory predicts, with most bids lying above the 45 degree line. However they
underbid relative to the RNNE, and to a much greater extent than strong bidders overbid
relative the RNNE, with the upper end of the IQR just a little above 10 except at the
highest value and the median bid below 10 throughout. This compares to the RNNE bid
which is already at 11 for vi = 4 for weak bidders and goes as high as 27.5 for vi = 10.
This underbidding by weak bidders results in them winning only about half of the auctions
they are predicted to win (25.6% actual versus 49.9% predicted; see Table 2 above).
Reserve prices for weak bidders when they do win are shown in Figure 4, along with
predicted reserve prices (the straight line through the origin) (r∗Nash) and the empirical
best response line (the wavy, almost horizontal line) (r∗BR) given the distribution of strong
bidders’ bids (in conjunction with the rather heroic assumption that bidders have observed
the whole empirical distribution of bids).4 The r∗BR is high as it is sensitive to the fact that
there are some strong types who underbid a lot which skews the best response upward.
The observed reserve prices were almost always between the ones predicted by the Nash
equilibrium (r∗Nash) and the ones best responding to the empirical distribution (r∗BR). Note,
that strong bidders rarely rejected a resale oﬀer that would have given them a positive
proﬁt.5
Proﬁts of weak bidders were consistently negative conditional on winning the
4For every possible bid bi we ﬁnd the private values of the opponents that bid less than this bid,
(vj |bj < bi) and search for the reserve price r that would yield the highest expected payoﬀ.
5Proﬁtable oﬀers were rejected about 15% of the time in the ﬁrst 10 auctions, but none after that.
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Figure 3: Series of boxplots of private values vs bids for the low and high types in treatment
10. Each box drawn represents the distribution of the bids for a block of values. The length of
the box represents the interquartile range (IQR). The whisker extends from the box to the most
extreme data value whithin 1,5 times the IQR. The dashed thin straight lines through the origin
represent the equilibrium bids and the solid thick lines represent the 45 degree line.
auction, averaging -3.5 per period on average. Average proﬁts of weak players conditional
on winning would have been -3.1 if they set reserve prices according to r∗Nash versus -
1.0 setting them according to r∗BR. These low/negative proﬁts for weak bidders can be
accounted for by several factors. First, there were very little proﬁts to be made in the
ﬁrst place, as (unconditional) expected proﬁts are around 1 ECU per period, with a rather
unappealing distribution: weak bidders lose money almost as often as they make money
(48% vs 52%) with mean proﬁts of 15.2 when earning positive proﬁts and mean proﬁts of
-11.8 when they lose money. The latter would tend to push weak players bids down on
account of risk (or loss) aversion. While, other things equal, this would have helped weak
types to make greater than predicted proﬁts conditional on winning, it results in them
winning far less often than predicted. The other factor that accounts for the negative
proﬁts is the tendency of strong players to bid above the RNNE. This means that when
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weak players win, strong players values are lower than what they would have been had the
strong player bid the RNNE. This in turn results in lower proﬁts conditional on winning
for weak players. The data are entirely consistent with this: If both players had bid
according to the RNNE, weak players would have won with a bid above the strong players
bid 26.6% of the time, thereby earning negative proﬁts. In contrast, weak players won
with a bid above the strong players’s value 41.0% of the time, around 50% more often
than predicted, thereby generating a substantially higher frequency of winning and losing
money as a consequence. In other words, strong types bidding above the RNNE (even
by a modest amount) substantially reduces weak players opportunities to earn positive
proﬁts. This, in conjunction with the low predicted proﬁts to begin with, pushes weak
players’ proﬁts over the edge to earning small negative proﬁts.

























Figure 4: Reserve prices in treatment 10. We plot the observed ones, the ones that should be
set according to theory and the ones that would be a best response to actual behavior.
Loss (or risk) aversion, in conjunction with the negative average proﬁts realized
helps to explain why weak players bid below the RNNE, as well as why there is no con-
vergence to equilibrium. In fact, as Figure 5 shows, what learning/adjustment in bidding
there is for weak types was to bid lower over time. Also note there is a deviation from the
trend line towards lower bidding around period 20 when roles were switched. However,
after a few periods, weak players bids revert back to lower bidding over time.
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Looking at strong bidders, average proﬁts were quite close to the level predicted
under the RNNE: 28.9 per period versus 30.2. Given the underbidding of weak types, they
could have done even better than predicted, earning 33.8 per period if they best responded
to the weak bidders and bid less.
Despite the fact that subjects deviate from the equilibrium bidding, auction prices
were close to the level predicted (see Table 2 above). This however should not be attributed
to the theory predicting bids correctly, but to the fact that bids of both types deviate from
the theory in such a way as to get close to predicted prices: Weak types underbid and
win much less often than they should, resulting in strong bidders winning more often than
predicted. And they are bidding reasonably close to equilibrium or slightly above it so
that auction prices are slightly higher than predicted. Although we do not have any data
for bidding in this treatment, without resale we would never expect prices to exceed 10+ε,
as minimally rational weak bidders would not overbid and strong bidders would anticipate
this.6 Using this as an upper bound for what prices would have been absent resale, we
can say that resale would have resulted in essentially doubling prices compared to the no
resale case.
Interim eﬃciency, deﬁned as the percentage of cases where the highest value bidder
wins the auction, is predicted to 0.54, but is much higher at 0.79. Resale of course improves
on this with average eﬃciency after accounting for resale of 0.89.
4.2 Weak Bidders with Value Draws [0, 34]
The underbidding by weak types in the W10 treatment more than likely resulted from
the relatively high probability of losses as weak types bid substantially above their resale
values in equilibrium and suﬀer losses close to half the time on winning the auction. In
contrast under the W34 treatment weak bidders bid their value in equilibrium so that any
risk from playing the equilibrium bidding strategy has been eliminated. However, here too
proﬁts conditional on winning are relatively low for weak types which may serve to dampen
6See Gueth et al (2005) for asymmetric auctions without resale with supports similar to those employed
here. They observe that strong bidders rarely bid more than the highest possible value in the support of
the weak bidder.
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Figure 5: Bid deviation over time for both types in treatment 10.
First Stage Second Stage
Prices Interim Eﬃciency Weak type wins Prices Eﬃciency
predicted 22.0 0.69 0.50 24.9 0.93
actual 26.0 0.78 0.37 27.2 0.92
Table 3: Summary of results in treatment 34.
their incentives, plus they need to ﬁgure out how to set reserve prices so as to maximize
expected earnings. The downside of setting aW higher to eliminate the possibility of weak
types suﬀering losses in equilibrium is that the larger aW is relative to aS, the smaller the
eﬀect of resale compared to the no resale case.
Figure 6 reports bids for both strong and weak types under W34.7 Now, except at the
very highest values, strong bidders tend to overbid relative to the RNNE more than in
the previous treatment, and bids have a larger variation for the middle range of values.
On the other hand weak types bid much closer to their predicted values throughout. As
a consequence, weak bidders win substantially more of often than in the W10 treatment,
36.6% of the auctions compared to 25.6% with W10. This is still signiﬁcantly less than the
49.6% predicted in equilibrium (see Table 3), largely as a result of strong types bidding
more than predicted.
Resale prices for weak bidders are shown in Figure ?? along with the reserve prices
7Note that for the weak type the RNNE and the 45 degree line diﬀer a bit. This is because the RNNE
predicts exact value bidding only when the maximum private value of the weak type is 100/3. In the
experiment we rounded this up to 34.
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Figure 6: Series of boxplots of private values vs bids for the low and high types in treatment
34. Each box drawn represents the distribution of the bids for a block of values. The length of
the box represents the interquartile range (IQR). The whisker extends from the box to the most
extreme data value whithin 1,5 times the IQR. The dashed thin straight lines through the origin
represent the equilibrium bids and the solid thick lines represent the 45 degree line.
predicted under the RNNE and with best responding to strong players bids. Except for a
few outliers involving very high reserve prices, 100 or very close to it, that would preclude
any opportunity for resale, reserve prices track the rRNNE reasonably closely.8 Note, that
once again rBR > rRNNE, particularly when winning with relatively low bids, as weak
bidders should take advantage of strong types’ occasional very low bids.
Proﬁts for weak types who won the ﬁrst auction were 2.9 per period on average, very
close to the level predicted under the RNNE9 (3.5 per period) or had they best used best
response reserve prices (3.8 per period). These positive proﬁts are in marked contrast
8These seven very high reserve prices (80 or above) come from three subjects. In all cases these
bidders had positive proﬁts from bidding in the auction. There were occasional rejections of proﬁtable
resale proposals, 3.2% of all such oﬀers.
9This is calculated given the actual bids of weak and strong types and assuming that they chose the
Nash reserve prices in the resale stage.
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Figure 7: Reserve prices in treatment 34. We plot the observed ones, the ones that should be
set according to theory and the ones that would be a best response to actual behavior.
to weak types negative proﬁts in the W10 treatment. The positive realized proﬁts, in
conjunction with the fact that bidding ones value is a perfectly safe strategy for weak
bidders helps to explain why weak types are bidding closer to equilibrium under the W34
treatment. That is, part of the explanation for weak types closer to equilibrium play
results from the fact that the theory no longer requires them to continuously risk losses.
Average proﬁt per period for strong types was 20.8. This too is very close to the
RNNE of 21.5 per period, and a little less than with best responding, 24.8. Note that
these somewhat lower proﬁts relative to best responding can be fully accounted for by
the fact that strong types consistently bid above the RNNE, a common characteristic of
bidding in standard (no resale) ﬁrst-price sealed bid auction experiments (see Kagel, 1995
and Kagel and Levin, 2008, for survey results on this point). The higher than predicted
bids for strong types resulted in auction prices that were higher than predicted (26.0 versus
22.0; see Table 3) and weak types winning less often than predicted (36.6% of the time
versus 49.6%).
Figure 8 plots bids over time. There is much less learning/adjustment in bids over
time than in the W10 treatment.
15











Figure 8: Bid deviation over time for both types in treatment 34.
4.2.1 Dual Markets
The dual market treatment is designed to establish a clear distinction between bidding
with and without resale, as the same subjects were asked to bid using the same private
values, ﬁrst without resale and then with resale.
In the W34 treatment, there is not much diﬀerence in predicted bids for strong types
with and without resale. But for weak types bids are predicted to increase uniformly with
resale. Using individual subject data as the unit of observation, 73.5% (25 out of 34) of
weak bidders bid higher on average with resale than without. Of these, 84.0% (21 out
of 25) bid signiﬁcantly higher with resale than without (based on a one tailed t-test, p
< 0.05). Of the remaining bidders, 17.6% (6 out of 34) bid exactly the same with and
without resale, and 8.8% (3 out of 34) bid less, but none signiﬁcantly less (using a t-test).
Table 4 compares prices and eﬃciency with and without resale. Under the RNNE
average prices are predicted to increase from 18.3 with no resale to 25.1 with resale, an
increase of some 37.2%. Actual prices increased from 26.4 without resale to 32.0 with
resale (p < 0.00, one-tailed t-test), an increase of 21.2%. The lower than predicted price
increase can be accounted for by bidding above the RNNE by strong and weak types in
the ﬁrst-price auctions without resale (see Figure 9) which carries over, for strong types at
least, to the resale option (recall Figure 6). Eﬃciency, as measured by the frequency with
which the high value bidder wins the item, is predicted to increase very modestly from
.91 without resale to .92 with resale. Actual eﬃciency moves modestly in the opposite
16




























Figure 9: Bidding in the dual market treatment, with and without resale.





























Figure 10: Boxplots of actual bids for the two types compared with the theory, in the dual
market (no resale case).
direction, from 89 without resale to 88% with resale.
One of the key predictions of the model with asymmetric valuations and resale is that
the distribution of bids will be symmetric with resale, but will be asymmetric absent
resale. Figure 11, top panel, shows the distribution of bids with resale (left panel) and
17
First Stage Second Stage
Prices Eﬃciency Weak type wins Prices Eﬃciency
resale predicted 22.3 0.70 0.50 25.1 0.92
actual 30.3 0.75 0.40 32.0 0.88
no resale predicted 18.3 0.91 0.27 - -
actual 26.4 0.89 0.27 - -
Table 4: Summary of results in treatment 34dual.
absent resale (right panel) if everyone played according to the RNNE. The distribution on
the left is essentially perfectly symmetric. The one on the right is not and has a higher
frequency of high end bids. The bottom panel of Figure 11 shows the actual distribution
of bids. There are several things worth noting. First, the actual distribution has a handful
high bids well above the predicted upper bound of bidding (the upper bounds are 33.5
with resale, 25.4 without). Second, there is a clear change in the distribution of bids going
from no resale to resale (p < 0.01 using a two sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test). Third,
and most importantly, there are more high end bids with resale (there is a bigger weight
on bids between 30 and 40, with the tail of very high bids not much diﬀerent between the
two cases) and the distribution with resale is closer to uniform. Thus, although the point
predictions of the model are not satisﬁed, as they rarely are in the experimental auction
literature, the bid distribution moves in the direction predicted under the theory.
5 Conclusions
We have investigated Hafalir and Krishna’s (2008) model of auctions with resale where
bidders have asymmetric valuations. Theory predicts two strong eﬀects. First, bidding
by weak types should become more aggressive and auction prices should increase. Second
the distribution of bids becomes symmetric so that one cannot distinguish between weak
and strong types on the basis of their bids. While these results do not hold perfectly
(or close to perfectly), we ﬁnd that the resale opportunity causes weak bidders to bid
more aggressively in the ﬁrst stage auction in order to win and resell, with the result that
18




























Figure 11: Bid distributions resulting from a monte carlo simulation (100.000 draws) of a resale
market and a no resale market (upper panel). The weak bidder has a value in the support [0,34].
In the lower panel, actual bid distributions with resale (lower left panel) and without (lower right
panel).
auction prices increase making sellers better oﬀ. The distribution of bids becomes more
symmetric as well.
Auctions outcomes are much closer to the theoretical prediction when the equilibrium
outcome for weak types does not require them to bid substantially above their private
values with resale. Although weak bidders do, indeed, bid above their private values when
the theory calls for them to do so, they do not bid nearly as high as the RNNE predicts.
The latter probably results from a combination of risk (or loss) aversion and the fact that
weak bidders earn negative average proﬁts in this treatment. The negative average proﬁts
result from the low proﬁt opportunities available to begin with in conjunction with the fact
that strong players tend to bid more than the RNNE predicts, which substantially reduces
the scope for proﬁtable resale on weak player’s part. Moving to treatment conditions in
which the equilibrium calls for weak bidders to essentially bid their value, outcomes come
much closer to the RNNE prediction. In fact they come remarkably close in a number of
dimensions.
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As noted, one problem with our ﬁrst treatment in which equilibrium play calls for weak
types to bid substantially above their private values is that there is little scope for proﬁts
for weak types and the rather unappealing distribution of earnings conditional on winning
even if everyone follows equilibrium play perfectly. As such one area for future research
will be to explore bidding in auctions with resale that call for weak types to bid above their
values but not in quite such a hostile environment; i.e., one that has higher expected proﬁts
conditional on winning and/or a substantially higher probability of positive as opposed to
negative proﬁts conditional on winning.
References
[1] Garratt, Rod and T. Troeger (2006) "Speculation in Standard Auctions with Resale"
Econometrica 74, 753-769.
[2] Georganas, Sotiris (2003) "Auctions with Resale: An Experimental Study", masters
thesis, University of Bonn
[3] Guth, Werner, Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel and Elmar Wolfstetter, (2005). "Bidding
behavior in asymmetric auctions: An experimental study," European Economic Re-
view, Elsevier, vol. 49(7), pages 1891-1913, October.
[4] Hafalir, Isa Emin and Vijay Krishna, "Asymmetric Auctions with Resale", (2008).
American Economic Review
[5] Hafalir, Isa Emin and Vijay Krishna, "Revenue and Eﬃciency Eﬀects of Resale in
First-Price Auctions", (2009). Journal of Mathematical Economics
[6] Haile, Philip A. (2000) "Partial Pooling at the Reserve Price in Auctions with Resale
Opportunities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 231-248,
November.
[7] Haile, Philip A. (2001) "Auctions with Resale Markets: An Application to U.S. Forest
Service Timber Sales" American Economic Review, vol. 91, issue 3, pages 399-427
20
[8] Haile, Philip A. (2003) "Auctions with private uncertainty and resale opportunities",
Journal of Economic Theory 108, 72-110
[9] Lange, Andreas, John A. List, Michael K. Price (2004) "Auctions with Resale When
Private Values Are Uncertain: Theory and Empirical Evidence", NBER Working
Paper No. w10639
[10] Plum, M, (1992). "Characterization and Computation of Nash-Equilibria for Auctions
with Incomplete Information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol.
20(4), pages 393-418.
21
